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SOUTHWESTERN LA W JOURNAL
Fifth Amendment Protection Against Self-Incrimination
in Tax Records: Fisher v. United States
The Internal Revenue Service brought an action to enforce a summons
seeking the production by Fisher, an attorney, of documents relating to his
client's income tax returns. The documents, containing an analysis of the
taxpayer's income and expenses as determined from cancelled checks and
deposit slips, had been prepared by the client's accountant and ultimately
placed in Fisher's possession. Shortly after the IRS had begun an investiga-
tion, the taxpayer had obtained the documents from his accountant and
delivered them to his attorney. Fisher refused to comply with the summons on
the grounds that insofar as the documents were constitutionally protected
from summons while in the hands of the client, they were also protected while
in the possession of the attorney. I The Third Circuit upheld the enforcement
order of the district court,2 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.3 Held,
affirmed: Records prepared by an accountant and delivered to a taxpayer are
not protected by the fifth amendment; hence, such documents are not pro-
tected while in the hands of an attorney. Fisher v. United States, 96 S. Ct.
1569, 48 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1976).
I. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT'S APPLICATION TO TAXPAYERS' DOCUMENTS
The fifth amendment protects against more than compulsory oral self-
incrimination. In Boyd v. United States4 the amendment prevented the com-
pulsory production of personal documents. The Government sought to
introduce into evidence an invoice which indicated that the Boyd partnership
had attempted to defraud the Government. The partnership objected on fifth
amendment grounds. The United States Supreme Court held that the invoice
was inadmissible, stating that "a compulsory production of private books and
papers . . . is compelling [an individual] to be a witness against himself,
within the meaning of the Fifth amendment . . . . '
Although often cited with approval, 6 the holding in Boyd has been limited in
subsequent litigation. The most prominent limitation is that the fifth amend-
ment does not permit a custodian of corporate documents to withhold such
I. The attorney claimed that enforcement of the summons would violate not only the fifth
amendment, but also the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure.
Further, he argued that the documents were protected under the attorney-client privilege since
they would have been protected while in the possession of the taxpayer.
2. United States v. Fisher, 500 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1974).
3. Consolidated with Fisher is United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1974), in
which the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's enforcement order. In Kasmirthe documents
sought included accountant's workpapers pertaining to the taxpayer's income tax returns for
1969, 1970, and 1971, retained copies of the taxpayer's income tax returns for 1969, 1970, and
1971, and retained copies of reports and other correspondence between the taxpayer and his
accountant during 1969, 1970, and 1971. The Supreme Court's holding reversed the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Kasmir.
4. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
5. Id. at 634-35.
6. See, e.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87 (1974), in which the Supreme Court
stated that it "has long been established, of course, that the fifth amendment privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal
papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony."
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records for fear of self-incrimination. 7 This limitation was later expanded to
include virtually all documents held by an individual in a representative
capacity for a collective entity.8
A justification for distinguishing between private and corporate documents
arises from the fact that the fifth amendment is designed to protect only the
individual from self-incrimination. 9 The privilege is a personal one'0 which
cannot be asserted by an artificial entity. Moreover, the fifth amendment
stands, to a certain degree, to protect the privacy of the individual." These
underlying policies of the fifth amendment are in no way served by protecting
collective entities; hence, such artificial beings are not protected from the
compelled production of incriminating evidence.
Historically, the application of the fifth amendment reflects the personal
and private nature of the privilege against self-incrimination and its objective
in protecting privacy interests. 2 Problems do, however, arise in determining
whether protection of particular documents will further fifth amendment
objectives. An individual's tax records present one such problem.
In United States v. Cohen3 an accountant delivered his work papers to a
client who was under investigation by the IRS. The taxpayer later refused to
comply with a summons ordering the production of the papers, claiming that
the papers might tend to incriminate him.'4 The Ninth Circuit held that the
documents were protected by the fifth amendment in two respects. First, the
production of the documents pursuant to the description on the summons
would constitute an incriminating admission of their identity and authentic-
ity.15 Second, the papers related solely to the taxpayer's personal affairs.' 6
Thus, enforcement of the summons against the wishes of the individual would
7. In Wilson v United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911), the Supreme Court held that a corporate
officer could not bar the production of corporate documents sought by a grand jury subpoena
duces tecum on the grounds that the documents might incriminate him. In Wilson the subpoena
was directed against the corporation. Even when the subpoena is directed against the individual
corporate officer, however, the Court has held that the documents are not protected by the fifth
amendment. Dreier v. United States, 221 U.S. 394 (1911). This exception was extended further in
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944), in which the Court held that an officer of a labor
union could not assert his fifth amendment right as grounds for refusing to obey a subpoena
directing him to produce union records.
8. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 101 (1974), wherein the Court held that a
partnership's documents may not be withheld upon the claim that the documents may tend to
incriminate the custodian holding them in a representative capacity for the partnership.
9. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944).
10. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322,327 (1973), in which the Court commented that
the fifth amendment privilege is an "intimate and personal one . . . which sprang from an
abhorrence of governmental assault against the single individual...." (Emphasis added.)
11. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). One of the major concerns throughout Boyd
was the protection of the privacy of the individual. Id. at 630; see note 30 infra.
In Boyd, however, the Court was also concerned with the fourth amendment. The Court stated
that the fourth and fifth amendments "run almost into each other" with respect to private papers.
116 U.S. at 630. For a contemporary discussion of the relationship between the fourth and fifth
amendments in this regard see Comment, Papers, Privacy and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments:
A Contitutional Analysis, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 626 (1974).
12. See Comment, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Tax Investi-
gations, 6 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1055 (1975).
13. 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967).
14. Id. at 466.
15. Id.
16. The court stated that "the work papers were scarcely public documents. They embody
countless items of information relating to Cohen's purely personal affairs, including itemizations
and summaries of data prepared directly from Cohen's bank statements, cancelled checks, and
similar records." Id. at 471.
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amount to an unconstitutional compulsion of possibly self-incriminating tes-
timony.' 7 An almost identical fact situation occurred in United States v.
Beattie.18 In that case, however, the Second Circuit held that the summons
was enforceable. In Beattie the court's analysis focused on the degree to
which the documents could be considered sufficiently private so as to be
entitled to fifth amendment protection. 9 As the documents had been com-
piled by another with the taxpayer's consent, the court did not believe that the
documents were truly "private." 20 These papers were viewed as being more
analogous to business documents than personal papers, 2' and, thus, the fifth
amendment was held to be inapplicable.
The conflict between Cohen and Beattie is even more perplexing in light of
the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Couch.22 In Couch the Court
held that an accountant served with a summons was not entitled to assert his
client's fifth amendment privilege.23 This holding was predicated upon the
fact that the person subject to incrimination, the client, was not being com-
pelled to do anything, 24 and, thus, there was no state intrusion upon the
client's sphere of privacy. 25 Possession of the documents by the taxpayer,
however, creates a presumption of sufficient personal compulsion to accord
fifth amendment protection. 26
Although Cohen and Beattie reached contrary conclusions, the Court's
analysis in both cases touched upon a central issue. Both courts gave direct
consideration to the degree to which the documents could be considered
private so as to be entitled to the fifth amendment privilege. By dealing with
the privacy issue, the courts at least maintained the proper respect for the
history of the fifth amendment. 27 Thus, whether an accountant's work papers
in the possession of the taxpayer are protected by the fifth amendment should
hinge on how private the papers are.
II. FISHER V. UNITED STATES
In Fisher v. United States the issue before the Supreme Court was whether
an accountant's work papers, delivered to an attorney by a taxpayer-client,
17. Id. at 472.
18. 522 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2165, 48 L. Ed. 2d 793 (1976), noted in
54 TEXAS L. REV. 432 (1975).
19. 522 F.2d at 272.
20. Id. at 276. The court did, however, modify the lower court's order which would have
compelled the production of Beattie's private letters. Id. at 279.
21. This reasoning is revealed by the fact that the court regarded the compelled production of
documents in Beattie as less of an invasion of privacy than there had been in Bellis. Id. at 273.
22. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
23. Id. at 328-29.
24. The Court stated that the "essential inquiry is whether [the taxpayer's interest enables
him] to assert successfully a privilege against compulsory self-incrimination to bar enforcement
of the summons and production of the records, despite the fact that the records no longer
remained in [his] possession." Id. at 327 (emphasis added).
25. The compulsion element ties in closely with the privacy goals of the fifth amendment:
one's privacy interest is invaded if one is compelled to act.
26. The Court stated that "actual possession of documents bears the most significant
relationship to Fifth Amendment protections against governmental compulsions upon the indi-
vidual accused of crime." 409 U.S. at 333. See also Note, Constitutional Law: Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination Denied as to Documents Recovered by Taxpayer from His Accountant and
Transferred to His Attorney, 59 MINN. L. REV. 751 (1975).
27. See generally Comment, The Taxpayer's Expectation of Privacy as a Bar to Production
of Records Held by His Attorney, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 666 (1975).
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would be shielded from discovery under the client's fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. If a taxpayer-client is immune under the
fifth amendment from a summons directing production of documents, then
due to the attorney-client privilege his attorney is also immune. 28 Thus, the
question before the Court was actually whether or not a taxpayer is privileged
to withhold tax records prepared by an accountant.2 9 To answer this question
the Court set out the following standard for fifth amendment application:3"
protection will be extended only if the summons compels the production of
"testimony" which tends to incriminate the taxpayer. 3' No protection will
exist if the aspects of the documents which may tend to incriminate the
individual are not testimonial in nature.
Although the Court accepted the proposition that a summons served on a
taxpayer involves considerable compulsion,32 the more important question
was whether a summons would compel "testimony." The fifth amendment
cannot be used as a shield merely because the evidence sought is incriminat-
ing;33 testimony must exist before the fifth amendment privilege can apply.
Therefore, the Court held that since the documents sought did not compel the
taxpayer to "restate, repeat or affirm the truth of the documents' " con-
tents, 34 they were not subject to the protection of the fifth amendment. 35 In
addition, as the preparation of the documents was "wholly voluntary," the
documents could not be said to contain any "compelled" testimonial evi-
28. 96 S. Ct. at 1577-78, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 52. The attorney-client privilege exists to encourage
clients to keep their attorneys fully informed. If the attorney is not protected when the client is,
then clients may hesitate before supplying the attorney with the necessary information for fear
that the information may be exposed. United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963). This
situation is to be distinguished from that in which the attorney attempts to assert his client's fifth
amendment privilege. As to this issue, the Court held that the attorney could not claim his client's
fifth amendment rights since, although the client was subject to incrimination, he was not the
person being compelled to produce anything. The Court stated that "it is not the taxpayer's fifth
amendment privilege that would excuse the attorney from production." 96 S. Ct. at 1573, 48 L.
Ed. 2d at 47.
29. Prior to addressing this issue, the Court pointed out that the claim of protection grounded
upon the fourth amendment was inapplicable. 96 S. Ct. at 1580, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 55; see note II
supra.
30. 96 S. Ct. at 1580, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 55. The Court's analysis of the fifth amendment ignores
many of the underlying policies of the privilege against self-incrimination. These policies were
outlined by the Supreme Court in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964):
[The fifth amendment] reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble
aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusato-
rial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-
incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our
sense of fair play which dictates 'a fair state-individual balance by requiring the
government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing
him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder
the entire load,' . . . our respect for the inviolability of the human personality
and of the right of each individual 'to a private enclave where he may lead a
private life' . . . .
Justice Brennan commented that the "Court's treatment... here is . . . most inadequate.
The gaping hole is in the omission of any reference to the taxpayer's privacy interests and to
whether the subpoenas impermissibly invade those interests." 96 S. Ct. at 1589,48 L. Ed. 2d at 66
(Brennan, J., concurring).




35. Id. But see Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951), in which the Supreme
Court noted that the fifth amendment protection extends to information which "would furnish a
link in the chain of evidence" necessary to prosecute the individual.
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dence. 36 All that is compelled is the production of the documents, not their
preparation.
The act of producing the documents in compliance with the summons,
however, presumes that the taxpayer believes he is delivering the papers
described in the summons, that the documents exist, and that they are in his
possession and under his control. 37 Since the act of producing the papers is
compelled, an additional analysis was required to determine whether or not
the fifth amendment should apply. Such analysis involved two questions:
first, whether or not the information conveyed by the production of the
evidence amounts to "testimony" for the purposes of the fifth amendment ,38
and, if so, whether that testimony is incriminating. 39 To respond to this issue
the Court determined that the information conveyed by compliance with the
summons was not "testimony" for purposes of fifth amendment applica-
tion.4° Since the existence and location of the papers were already known to
the IRS and were the only items of information surrendered by the act of
producing the documents, the taxpayer would be supplying no new informa-
tion by acting in compliance with the summons.41 "The question is not of
testimony but of surrender. "42 Consequently, the fifth amendment again was
held to have no application since no testimony was compelled by the act of
producing the documents in accordance with the summons. 43
The Court then assumed arguendo that the production of the accountant's
work papers had some "minimal testimonial value."",44 Nevertheless, the fifth
amendment was held to have no application since there is nothing unlawful in
securing an accountant to aid in preparing tax returns, nor in having an
36. 96 S. Ct. at 1580, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 55. Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion, however,
indicated that "it does not follow that the protection is necessarily unavailable if the papers were
prepared voluntarily, for it is the compelled production of testimonial evidence, not just the
compelled creation of such evidence, against which the privilege protects." Id. at 1586-87, 48 L.
Ed. 2d at 63 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Contrary to the premises advanced by both the Court and Justice Brennan, one wonders if the
contents are not in some sense "compelled." To claim that bringing tax information to an
accountant for compilation is not compelled is equivalent to claiming that the taxpayer had a
choice in the matter, that he could have compiled the information himself. The Court's conclu-
sion on this point is misguided. Many persons are incapable of compiling their own tax informa-
tion, and, thus, the delivery of the information to the accountants cannot be said to be totally
voluntary.
37. Id. at 1580, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 56.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1580-81, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 56-57.
41. Id. at 1581, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 56. Brennan criticized this reasoning as a "principle which
makes the testimonial nature of evidence, and therefore, one's protection against incriminating
himself, turn on the strength of the Government's case against him." Id. at 1589, 48 L. Ed. 2d at
66.
42. Id. at 1581, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 56, quoting In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274, 279 (1911).
43. The Court also pointed out that it had upheld subpoenas served upon custodians of
corporate documents over objections that they might incriminate the custodians. After citing
numerous cases, the Court stated that the "existence and possession or control of subpoenaed
documents being no more in issue here than in the above cases, the summons is equally
enforceable." 96 S. Ct. at 1581, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 57. The cases cited by the Court, however, do not
seem to support this proposition. In the most recent of such cases, Bellis v. United States, 417
U.S. 85, 92 (1974), the Court's refusal to permit custodians of corporate documents to assert the
fifth amendment rests upon the ground that "corporate records do not contain the requisite
element of privacy or confidentiality essential for privilege to attach." Thus, even if the exist-
ence, possession, or control of the documents were in issue, the fifth amendment should still
remain inapplicable to corporate records.
44. 96 S. Ct. at 1581, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 57.
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accountant deliver work papers into the possession of a taxpayer. Since there
exists no testimony as to illegal acts, there is no testimony which can tend to
be incriminating. 5
Since the fifth amendment does not protect the taxpayer who is in posses-
sion of documents prepared by an accountant, the attorney-client privilege
does not protect the attorney from compliance with a summons demanding
production of such documents. The attorney-client privilege can be applied
only to further its purpose: to prevent the client from failing to keep his
attorney fully informed for fear that disclosed information may be obtained
by third parties. 6 This purpose is in no way served by allowing the client to
shield from the Government otherwise nonprivileged documents merely by
delivering them to an attorney.
Mr. Justice Brennan concurred in the decision4 7 but expressed dissatisfac-
tion with the Court's analysis.4 In his view the scope of the fifth amendment
is controlled to a great extent, not by the amendment's language, but by the
privacy interest the amendment was intended to protect.49 Thus, the threshold
question should be whether or not the documents sought are sufficiently
private to be entitled to protection. 50 Although Brennan thought the docu-
ments in question did not possess the requisite privacy qualities, 51 he was
concerned about the Court's failure to address this issue adequately. 52 By not
deciding this point he feared the Court may have established a precedent for
future decisions which would further restrict the protection to be afforded
personal documents.
53
Although the decision in Fisher is correct, the Court's analysis should not
have been grounded upon such a strained and overly technical interpretation
of the fifth amendment. A better reasoned rationale would have centered
upon the accountant's work papers as being insufficiently private to be
45. Id.
46. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
47. 96 S. Ct. at 1582, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 58. Brennan's concurring opinion contains an extensive
historical analysis of the fifth amendment and the cases which have been decided under it.
48. Id. at 1582, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 58. Justice Brennan's grounds for concurring were based on
the prior access to the documents by the accountant, and the business rather than personal nature
of the papers. He did not expand on these grounds. Apparently, he felt these facts removed the
privacy aspect of the documents on which fifth amendment claims should be based. The business
nature of the papers renders them more akin to corporate documents than personal papers, and as
such they are not entitled to the same protection. See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,
327 U.S. 186, 204-05 (1946), in which the Court noted that private corporations have historically
"been subject to broad visitorial power .... Correspondingly, it has been settled that corpora-
tions are not entitled to all of the constitutional protections which private individuals have
49. 96 S. Ct. at 1584, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 60.
50. Id.
51. See note 48 supra and accompanying text. In Brennan's opinion the critical question is
whether the documents are private enough to be sheltered by the privilege. 96 S. Ct. at 1584,48 L.
Ed. 2d at 60. Since he concurred in the judgment of the Court, it follows that he judged the papers
as not sufficiently private.
52. 96 S. Ct. at 1583, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 58-59.
53. Id. Mr. Justice Marshall concurred on similar grounds although he expressed less
concern for future misuse of the Court's analysis. Id. at 1590,48 L. Ed. 2d at 67. In his view there
exists an inverse relationship between the private nature of the documents and the extent to
which their existence may be assumed. Thus, the more private the documents, the less the
Government may assume they exist. Under this analysis the act of producing the documents
would provide substantial testimony. It follows that as substantial testimony would be provided,
the fifth amendment would apply.
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